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INTRODUCTION
While many of the ramifications of Washington's 19811 and
19862 Tort Reform Acts have been divined by the courts, some
pockets of uncertainty remain. One such area confronts parties
involved in multiple tortfeasor civil litigation. The primary remaining
issues are (1) whether a defendant can implead by way of a "third-
party complaint" another tortfeasor whom the plaintiff has chosen not
to sue; and (2) whether a defendant who has settled a lawsuit or has
had a judgment taken against it may pursue other tortfeasors for
reimbursement of the monies paid to the tort victim. Such an action
might be brought under the theories of contribution, indemnification,
or subrogation.
In 1981, the Washington Legislature for the first time created a
limited right of contribution.3 A jointly and severally liable defendant,
forced to pay another tortfeasor's share of a settlement or judgment,
could now sue for reimbursement.4 But in 1986, the Legislature
generally abolished joint and several liability and replaced it with
proportionate liability, with defendants now responsible only for their
respective shares of fault.' Two exceptions to the general rule of
* Shareholder, Keating, Bucklin & McCormack P.S., Seattle, Washington; B.A. 1982,
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1. 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 27.
2. 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 305.
3. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040 and .050 (1996).
4. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040.
5. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070 (1996).
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proportionate liability were created: "factual" and "procedural" joint
and several liability.6 The first exception involves the factual existence
of an agency or employment relationship, or concerted action.7 The
second exception requires the procedural entry of a judgment against
multiple defendants, with a fault-free plaintiff.'
The confusion about the propriety of an action for reimbursement
arises mainly because of the imperfect meshing of these two acts.
While the 1986 Act abolished joint and several liability, the right of
contribution created by the 1981 Act remained.' And because
contribution rests primarily on the existence of joint and several
liability, the question arises as to whether a right of contribution serves
any purpose under present law. The answer is that contribution still
has vitality, but only when joint and several liability exists-now an
infrequent occurrence.
Contribution enjoyed a short wave of popularity between 1981
and 1986.'° It was common for defendants to implead other tortfea-
sors into lawsuits by third-party complaints, to make cross-claims
against other defendants, and to pursue post-settlement or post-
judgment claims.11 But the basic premise for this internecine litiga-
tion was seriously undermined by the abolition of joint and several
liability in 1986. Because defendants are now (as a general rule) only
responsible for their own proportionate share of liability, they can
never be forced to pay the share of another tortfeasor. Thus, after the
1986 Act, there has been generally no basis for contribution claims.
However, this vestige of the past still inappropriately finds its way into
current tort litigation.
This Article will discuss the propriety of claims for statutory
contribution in two contexts: cases involving actively negligent
tortfeasors, and cases involving both actively and passively negligent
tortfeasors. It will also analyze whether, and under what circum-
stances, a right of reimbursement might be pursued under the
equitable theories of contribution, subrogation, or indemnification.
This Article argues that unless an exception to the general rule of
proportionate liability exists, a third-party complaint for contribution
has no legal basis. The only applicable exception is the factual joint
and several liability provision dealing with employment, agency, and
6. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(lXa) and (b).
7. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a).
8. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b).
9. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040 and .070.
10. In this author's experience, this phenomenon occurred mainly at the trial level.
11. Id.
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concerted action. The procedural joint and several liability provision
does not apply to a third-party lawsuit, because judgment against
multiple "defendants" will not be entered. Moreover, an agent or
employee cannot sue the vicariously liable principal or employer for
contribution. Thus, the only situation in which a third-party
complaint can be brought by a principal/employer against an
agent/employee is when it is brought to recoup monies the principal/
employer could be forced to pay under a theory of vicarious liability.
Cross-claims for contribution between defendants are permissible
but premature. While joint and several liability may arise under either
the factual or the procedural exception, there is no need to seek
contribution until one has actually been forced to pay another's share.
Moreover, because a defendant seldom pays more than its proportion-
ate share, post-settlement and post-judgment contribution actions are
seldom necessary.
Outside of the statutory right of contribution, three equitable
theories of reimbursement potentially exist: contribution, indemnifica-
tion and subrogation.12 However, the common law has long prohibit-
ed an actively negligent tortfeasor from using equity to seek reimburse-
ment.13 While the common law recognized several exceptions for
passively negligent tortfeasors who sought indemnification from one
whose active negligence subjected them to liability, the 1981 Act
abolished this exception when it created the statutory right of
contribution.4
Questions have been posed as to whether statutory contribution
is even applicable in the agency/employment context, and whether
other equitable theories should be used instead by a passively negligent
party. This Article concludes that despite some conceptual flaws in
the application of the statute, contribution is available to a principal/
employer against the agent/employee whose active negligence rendered
the principal/employer vicariously liable.
Because the 1981 Act abolished equitable (implied) indemnity, the
only common-law reimbursement theory remaining is equitable
subrogation.15 However, courts will not resort to equity to fashion a
remedy when a statutory or legal remedy already exists, and because
contribution is available to an employer/principal, a claim for equitable
subrogation is unnecessary.
12. See discussion infra, Part II.
13. See id.
14. See 1991 Wash. Laws ch. 27 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(3)).
15. See Newcomer v. Masini, 45 Wash. App. 284, 287, 724 P.2d 1122, 1125 (1986).
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Section I summarizes the history and development of tort law in
Washington, with an emphasis on the impact of the 1981 and 1986
Tort Reform Acts and their imperfect union. Section II outlines the
traditional equitable remedies that are potentially available to a
tortfeasor seeking reimbursement for having paid more than its share.
Section III sets out the above-referenced thesis and explains why under
current law a tortfeasor's suit for reimbursement should be the
exception, not the rule. The need, and the basis, for such litigation is
dependent upon the existence of joint and several liability-which now
occurs only infrequently.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT AND MODIFICATION OF TORT
LAW IN WASHINGTON
Over time, by legislative enactment and case law, certain harsh
common law doctrines have been modified. In 1973, the Washington
Legislature enacted a "pure" comparative negligence system. 6 In
1981 and 1986, significant tort-reform legislation was enacted. 7 The
1981 Act authorized a tortfeasor's action for contribution for the first
time in Washington history.1" Later, the 1986 Act largely eliminated
the doctrine of joint and several liability. 9 All this occurred against
a backdrop of significantly expanding theories of tort liability.
A. A Brief Historical Review of Tort Law
The law of torts is concerned with the allocation of losses arising
out of human activities. It is a creature of social theory whose"primary purpose, of course, is to make a fair adjustment of the
conflicting claims of the litigating parties."20 Our courts and legisla-
tures are routinely called upon to make adjustments to the rules to
create a more equitable system. The Washington Legislature has
indicated that while decisional law has resulted in significant progress
and has eliminated the harshness of many common law doctrines, "the
legislature has from time to time felt it necessary to intervene to bring
about needed reforms." 21
16. See 1973 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 138, § 1 (former WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.010
as amended in WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.005 and .015 (1996)).
17. See 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 27 and 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 305.
18. See 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 27, § 12B (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040 and
.050).
19. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070.
20. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 3, at
15 (5th ed. 1984).
21. 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 27, § 1.
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The course of tort law since the late 1950s has been an expansion
of tort liability. New theories and causes of action were created. The
rules regarding statutes of limitation, contributory negligence,
causation, and immunities were relaxed. Most of these changes worked
to the benefit of injured parties in civil actions against a widely
expanded list of tortfeasors.22
These trends occurred against the backdrop of a well-developed
body of common law. Two of the harsher common law rules were
joint and several liability,23 and contributory negligence.24 Joint and
several liability was denounced as a system that imposed liability not
based upon fault, but rather upon the ability to pay. 5 Under the
common law, joint,26 concurrent,27 and successive" tortfeasors were
jointly and severally liable for all indivisible harm29 caused by their
22. See generally Gregory C. Sisk, Interpretation of the Statutory Modification of Joint and
Several Liability: Resisting the Deconstruction of Tort Reform, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 1,
11 (1992).
23. It had long been the rule that when multiple tortfeasors cause indivisible harm, each was
"liable for the entire harm caused and the injured party [could] sue one or all to obtain full
recovery." Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete, 91 Wash. 2d 230, 235, 588 P.2d 1308,
1312 (1978). For a general discussion of the doctrine of joint and several liability, see id. at 234-
36, 588 P.2d at 1311-14. Joint and several liability has existed in Washington since at least 1901.
See, e.g., Doremus v. Root, 23 Wash. 710, 713-714, 63 Pac. 572, 573 (1901).
24. The common law doctrine of contributory negligence dates to the early nineteenth
century English case of Butterfield v. Forrester. 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). See
also Hynek v. City of Seattle, 7 Wash. 2d 386, 395-98, 111 P.2d 247, 251-53 (1941). The
contributory negligence of a tort victim at common law worked as a total bar to recovery. See
Godfrey v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 959, 965, 530 P.2d 630, 633 (1975). The 1973 Legislature altered
this law to provide that a plaintiffs own fault no longer negated the right of recovery, it only
diminished a recovery. Id at 964-65, 530 P.2d at 633. This has became known as a "pure"
comparative negligence system. Id. at 955, 530 P.2d at 633.
25. See, e.g., Zakshersky v. City of New York, 562 N.Y.S.2d 371, 373 (1990).
26. "Joint tortfeasors are those who have acted in common or who have breached a joint
duty." Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 91 Wash. 2d at 235, 588 P.2d at 1312 (citations omitted). There
must exist "(1) a concert of action, (2) a unity of purpose or design, [and] (3) two or more
defendants working separately but to a common purpose and each acting with the knowledge and
consent of the others." Rauscher v. Halstead, 16 Wash. App. 599, 601, 557 P.2d 1324, 1325
(1976).
27. Concurrent tortfeasors are those whose separate acts, which breach independent duties,
concur to produce a single injury. See Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 91 Wash. 2d at 235, 588 P.2d
at 1312. See also Fugere v. Pierce, 5 Wash. App 592, 596, 490 P.2d 132, 134 (1971) (endorsing
the holding of Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d. 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948)).
28. Successive tortfeasors are those who, at different points in time, breach independent
duties to the plaintiff, causing harm which may be divisible or indivisible. See DeNike v.
Mowery, 69 Wash. 2d 357, 368, 418 P.2d 1010, 1017 (1966) (discussing classic example of
original wrongdoer and subsequent treating physician who caused further harm).
29. An "indivisible" injury is one that cannot be divided into discrete harms. See Seattle-
First Nat'l Bank, 91 Wash. 2d at 235-36, 588 P.2d at 1312. This indivisibility of harm is said
to warrant the imposition of the entire liability upon any tortfeasor whose acts are a proximate
cause of the harm. Id. See also Raucher, 16 Wash. App. at 601, 557 P.2d at 1326. The
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negligence.30 The victim could sue any one of these tortfeasors and
force that person to pay the entirety of the judgment.
The Washington Legislature recognized the harshness of
contributory negligence two decades ago. The rule was abolished in
1973 in favor of a "pure" system of comparative negligence that
permitted a plaintiff to recover some of his damages regardless of his
degree of fault.3' Joint and several liability was, however, not
abolished.32 This alignment of legal rules worked to the great benefit
of tort victims. 33
The dilemma created for defendants by the retention of joint and
several liability and the abolition of contributory negligence was
twofold. First, the expansive trends of tort law significantly increased
the liability of remote actors with "deep pockets." As a result, they
could now be required to pay a large judgment based upon only a
small percentage of fault. Second, statutory comparative negligence
applied only between the plaintiff and the defendants, not between the
defendants themselves; neither contribution nor apportionment of fault
was allowed.
In 1981, recognizing the harshness of the rule, the Washington
Legislature created a statutory right of contribution among tortfea-
sors. 34  Under the 1981 Act, a defendant who was jointly and
severally liable with another, and who had paid more than its share,
could sue the other tortfeasor asking for "contribution" to the loss.35
indivisible injury rule was incorporated into both the 1981 and 1986 acts. 1981 Wash. Laws ch.
27, § 11; 1986 Wash. Laws, ch. 305, § 402 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.030) (1996).
The statute provides: "Except as otherwise provided in RCW 4.22.070, if more than one person
is liable to a claimant on an indivisible claim for the same injury, death or harm, the liability of
such persons shall be joint and several." Id.
30. See, e.g., Rauscher, 16 Wash. App. at 602, 557 P.2d at 1324 (1976) (holding that all
those who contribute to the pollution of streams may be joined as defendants in the same action).
31. See 1973 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. ch. 138, § 1 (former WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.010,
codified as amended in WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22.005-.015).
32. See Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 91 Wash. 2d at 237, 588 P.2d at 1313.
33. "With the co-existence of comparative fault, joint and several liability, and [the absence
of] contribution, the pendulum had swung as far as it was going to in favor of the plaintiff." Keri
L. Ellison, Developments in the Law, The 1986 Washington Tort Reform Act, 23 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 211, 239 (1987).
34. 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 27, §§ 12 and 13 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22.040 and
.050 and sometimes referred to as the "Tort Reform Act of 1981 "). Sections 12 and 13 were part
of a larger products liability reform bill. See 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 27 (The title of the chapter
is Tort Actions-Products Liability-Contributory Negligence-Contribution.).
35. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(1) (1996). The statute provides:
A right of contribution exists between or among two or more persons who are jointly
and severally liable upon the same indivisible claim for the same injury, death or harm,
whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or any of them. It may be
enforced either in the original action or by a separate action brought for that purpose.
[Vol. 21:69
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The Legislature substituted the right of contribution for implied
indemnity, which it abolished.36 However, one significant provision
of the common law still remained: joint and several liability.
The doctrines of contributory negligence and joint and several
liability evolved together.37 They "grew out of the common law
concept of the [need for] unity of cause [because] of action(s) the jury
could not be permitted to apportion the damages, since there was but
one wrong."3  Because of the close relationship between the doc-
trines, the statutory abolition of contributory negligence caused some
to question the propriety of retaining joint and several liability.39
In 1978 the Washington Supreme Court was asked whether the
legislative adoption of comparative negligence mandated the judicial
abolition of joint and several liability.4 Although the Court answered
the question in the negative, it recognized that the legislature had the
authority to make such a change. 41 And, in 1986, the legislature did
SO.
B. The 1986 Tort Reform Act Replaced Joint and Several
Liability with Proportionate Liability
During the early and mid-1980s, "tort reform" swept the country.
It was fueled largely by an insurance-availability crisis and public polls
which showed few Americans supporting the underlying premise of
joint and several liability.42 A 1987 Harris Poll revealed that seventy
The basis for contribution among liable persons is the comparative fault of each such
person. However, the court may determine that two or more persons are to be treated
as a single person for purposes of contribution.
Id.
36. 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 27, § 12 (codified as amended in WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(3)
(1996)). In pertinent part, this section states that "[t]he common law right of indemnity between
active and passive tortfeasors is abolished." Id.
37. See Washburn v. Beatt Equip. Co., 120 Wash. 2d 246, 292, 840 P.2d 860, 885 (1992).
38. William L. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 413, 418 (1937).
39. One noted commentator summarized the policy argument for abandoning the rule of
joint and several liability as follows:
If a plaintiff may recover despite fault, suffering only a diminishment of recovery in
proportion to that fault, it is unjust to impose on a tortfeasor a liability greater than the
proportionate fault of the tortfeasor whose wrongdoing combined with the conduct of
the plaintiff and other parties to cause the harm. In other words, responsibility for
harm done should be distributed in proportion to the fault of all the parties involved
and not governed by concepts of causation.
Cornelius J. Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection and Modification of the Common Law Rule of
Joint and Several Liability, 62 WASH. L. REV. 233, 238 (1987).
40. See Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 91 Wash. 2d at 236-38, 588 P.2d at 1313 (1978).
41. See id. at 237, 588 P.2d at 1313.
42. See Kathryn T. Hicks, The Case for Reform: An Economic Analysis of Joint and Several
Liability after Comparative Negligence, 17 CAP. U. L. REV. 187, 197 (1988).
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percent of the United States population favored the elimination of joint
and several liability among defendants in tort actions." "Ultimately
the law must coincide with public opinion, and cannot stand against
it[.]"44 The Washington Legislature's response was the adoption of
what has become known as the "Tort Reform Act of 1986,"" which
largely abrogated the doctrine of joint and several liability.4 6  The
Washington Supreme Court held that the Act makes it clear that
proportionate liability is "intended to be the general rule .... "4 The
declared legislative purpose for this modification was to remedy the
unjustness of joint and several liability, and to address the concern
about affordable liability insurance.48 The Preamble to the Tort
Reform Act states, in part, that its purpose "is to enact further reforms
in order to create a more equitable distribution of the cost and risk of
injury and increase the availability and affordability of insurance."4 9
Proportionate liability is now the general rule in Washington. A
plain reading of the Tort Reform Act of 1986 and three recent
Washington Supreme Court decisions confirm that the Act largely
abolished joint and several liability in favor of a general rule of
several50 ("proportionate") liability.5" The trier of fact determines
43. See id.
44. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 3, at 18.
45. 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 305, §§ 100-912.
46. 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 305, § 401 (codified as amended in WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070
(1996)). The "centerpiece" of the Tort Reform Act of 1986 was the modification of joint and
several liability. See Sisk, supra note 22, at 6. "In this single section of the Act, the Washington
Legislature established a new foundation for tort liability---one of individual responsibility in
direct proportion to individual fault." Id. In addition to the joint and several liability provision,
the 1986 Act also addressed the accelerated waiver of the physician-patient privilege in section
101 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060 (1996)); the reasonableness of attorney's fees in
section 201 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.005 (1996)); limitation of actions for medical
malpractice in section 502 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.350 (1996)); the "felony
defense" in section 501 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.005 (1996)); the "alcohol defense"
in section 902 (as amended by 1987 Wash. Laws ch. 212, § 1001 and 1994 Wash. Laws ch. 275,
§ 30, codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 5.40.060 (1996)); and several other provisions now
scattered throughout Washington's Revised Code. See 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 305, §§ 100-912.
47. Washburn v. Beatt Equip. Co., 120 Wash. 2d 246, 294, 840 P.2d at 860, 886 (1992)
(citations omitted). Indeed, proportionate liability is "an exception that has all but swallowed the
general rule." Id. at 294 n.7, 840 P.2d at 886 n.7.
48. See id. at 292-93, 840 P.2d at 885.
49. 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 305, § 100.
50. Some have correctly criticized the use of the term "several" on the basis that at common
law "several" liability meant that any one of several defendants could be forced to pay for the
entire harm. See Bryan Harnetiaux, RCW 4.22.070, Joint and Several Liability, and the
Indivisibility of Harm, 27 GONZ. L. R. 193, 198 n.19 and accompanying text (1991/92). "Joint"
liability referred to the plaintiff's right to join all tortfeasors in a single action. Id. "Proportionate
liability" is the more accurate term. Id.
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the percentage of the total fault attributable to every "entity" that
caused the plaintiffs damages.5 2  "Entities" include the plaintiff(s),
defendant(s), third-party defendant(s), released and dismissed parties,
and any nonparty who possesses a defense or an immunity (except
immune employers).3
When joint and several liability exists, a defendant will usually be
responsible only for their share of fault as it is apportioned between
those defendants actually named in the suit. 4  "Empty chairs""5
were created for immune and absent entities and those with personal
defenses. Joint and several liability now only arises procedurally or by
establishing certain facts. 6 In some circumstances because of the
inapplicability of the Act; however, common law joint and several
liability may continue to govern. 7
51. See Anderson v. City of Seattle, 123 Wash. 2d 847, 850, 873 P.2d 489, 491 (1994);
Gerrard v. Craig, 122 Wash. 2d 288, 292, 857 P.2d 1033, 1035 (1993); and Washburn, 120 Wash.
2d at 294, 840 P.2d at 886.
52. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1). The statute provides:
In all actions involving fault of more than one entity, the trier of fact shall determine
the percentage of the total fault which is attributable to every entity which caused the
claimant's damages except entities immune from liability to the claimant under Title 51
RCW. The sum of the percentages of the total fault attributed to at-fault entities shall
equal one hundred percent. The entities whose fault shall be determined include the
claimant or person suffering personal injury or incurring property damage, defendants,
third-party defendants, entities released by the claimant, entities with any other
individual defends against the claimant, and entities immune from liability to the
claimant, but shall not include those entities immune from liability to the claimant
under Title 51 RCW. Judgment shall be entered against each defendant except those
who have been released by the claimant or are immune from liability to the claimant or
have prevailed on any other individual defense against the claimant in an amount which
represents that party's proportionate share of the claimant's total damages. The liability
of each defendant shall be several only and shall not be joint except: [as set forth in
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a) and (1Xb)].
Id.
53. See id. The statutory list of entities is "illustrative, as opposed to restrictive."
Arbitration of Fortin, 82 Wash. App. 74, 84, 914 P.2d 1209, 1214 (1996). The legislature did
not intend to limit the apportionment of fault to only those entities specifically enumerated in
RCW 4.22.070(1). See id.
54. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070. See also Anderson, 123 Wash. 2d at 851, 873 P.2d
at 491; Gerrard, 122 Wash. 2d at 292, 857 P.2d at 1035; and, Washburn, 120 Wash. 2d at 294,
840 P.2d at 886.
55. An empty chair, or nonparty "entity," describes the circumstance of a tortfeasor who is
not present in the courtroom, yet can still be apportioned fault by the parties to the suit. See
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1).
56. See infra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
57. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(3) (1996).
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C. The Exceptions to Proportionate Liability: "Factual" and
"Procedural" Joint and Several Liability
The 1986 Act creates two exceptions to the general rule of
proportionate liability. "Factual" joint and several liability arises when
a person acts as the "agent or servant" of a party, or when both were"acting in concert.""8 Acting in concert is said to require consciously
acting together in an unlawful manner.5 9
"Procedural" joint and several liability arises when the claimant
is free of fault and judgment is entered against multiple defendants.60
This type of joint and several liability is a modified version of the
common law rule: when a plaintiff is fault free, only those defendants
against whom judgment is entered are liable, and then only for "the sum
of their proportionate shares" of the plaintiff's total damages.61 Recall
that at common law, the plaintiff could single out one of several
tortfeasors for suit and force that defendant to pay for the entirety of
the harm.62 Defendants now are generally not liable for the share of
any at-fault entity that has no judgment taken against it as a defen-
dant.63
These two distinct statutory forms of joint and several liability can
logically be denominated "procedural" and "factual." Factual joint and
several liability arises under the agent/employee or acting-in-concert
exception of subsection (1)(a) of the Act. 64 A plaintiff may establish
joint and several liability factually, by introducing facts which establish
the employment or agency relationship, or the conspiracy. This factual
exception is in contrast to the second form of joint and several liability
under subsection (2)(b) where the fault-free plaintiff may procedurally
establish joint and several liability through the procedural entry of a
judgment against multiple defendants.65
Under the factual exception, joint and several liability can arise
between an employer and its employee for such torts as negligent
driving. Under the procedural exception, two motorists whose
independent acts of negligence united to cause the plaintiff injury may
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a).
59. See Moen v. Island Steel, 75 Wash. App. 480, 487, 878 P.2d 1246, 1250 (1994), rev'd
on other grounds, 128 Wash. 2d 745, 762 n.8, 912 P.2d 472, 481 n.8 (1996). See also Martin v.
Abbott Lab., 102 Wash. 2d 581, 596, 689 P.2d 368, 377-78 (1984).
60. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b) (emphasis added).
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. See Seattle-First National Bank, 91 Wash. 2d at 235, 588 P.2d at 1312.
63. See supra notes 46, 51, and 52.
64. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a).
65. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b).
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be held jointly and severally liable, but only when the plaintiff is fault-
free and a judgment has been entered against both defendants. At first
blush, the 1986 Act may appear to have expanded common law joint
and several liability, but in fact it did not. Although defendants who
would not have been jointly and severally liable previously-namely,
tortfeasors who could segregate the harms caused-may now, so long
as a judgment is entered against them, use the common law require-
ment that damages be "indivisible" for joint and several liability to
exist.66 Thus, if the defendants can segregate the plaintiff's damages,
then each defendant is liable only for that harm it actually caused.67
In addition, the defendants are entitled to an apportionment of fault
among all harm-causing entities, even for those damages that are
indivisible.68
The 1986 Act also wholly exempts three types of claims from the
reformed liability scheme: hazardous wastes and substances; tortious
interference with a contract or business relationship; and fungible
product claims.69 These claims remain subject to common-law joint
and several liability rules.7°
Under the Act, a party can be jointly and severally liable for the
acts of a nonparty, as was the case under the common law. Subsection
(1)(a) provides that "a party shall be responsible for the fault of another
person or for payment of the proportionate share of another party where
both were acting in concert or when a person was acting as an agent or
servant of the party. 71
66. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.030 (1996).
67. See, e.g., Phennah v. Whelan, 28 Wash. App. 19, 29, 621 P.2d 1304, 1310 (1980),
review denied, 95 Wash. 2d 1026 (1981) (holding that once a plaintiff has proven that successive
tortfeasors caused some damage, the burden of segregating those damages is upon the defendants).
68. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1). Indeed, one of the most important aspects of the
1986 Act is the monumental paradigm shift from joint and several liability for all harm (unless
the defendants could segregate seemingly "indivisible" harm) to a system of apportioning liability
based on "fault," free from anachronistic notions of causation and divisibility. See WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.22.015 (1996). Now, even where harm is indivisible, the jury apportions responsibility
to every harm-causing entity based upon its fault. For example, one defendant could be found
25% at fault for a plaintiff's indivisible injuries. This determination involves the nature of the
parties' conduct, and the extent of the causal relation between that conduct and the resultant
harm. See id.
69. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22.070(3)(a)-(c) (1996).
70. See, e.g., Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 667, 771 P.2d 711, 727-28,
modified by 780 P.2d 260 (1989) (concluding under WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(3) in a
products liability action that asbestos is a "hazardous substance," and thus common law joint and
several liability principles apply).
71. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a) (emphasis added). See also Gass v. McPherson's
Inc., 79 Wash. App. 65, 70, 899 P.2d 1325, 1328 (1995) (observing in dicta that such a result is
supported by the Act).
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Thus, even if a plaintiff is at fault, a defendant employer/principal
can be jointly and severally liable for the acts of its nonparty em-
ployee/agent. Similarly, even if the plaintiff is at fault, a defendant can
be jointly and severally liable for the fault of those who have acted in
concert. The rule would likewise apply if the employee/agent or co-
conspirator was a named defendant.
Who has the burden of apportioning fault to a nonparty depends
on who desires to blame the "empty chair." The 1986 Act mandates
that the trier of fact allocate fault to all "entities" that caused the
claimant's damages." Any party can assert that an entity is at fault.
However, this provision is not self-executing. One of the parties must
present evidence of an entity's fault before the allocation procedure is
invoked.73 "Only the plaintiff, however, can assert that another
person is liable to the plaintiff.'"4 If the plaintiff does not do so, the
burden is on the defendant to provide such proof. Additionally,
Washington court rules now require a defendant to assert nonparty
entity fault as an affirmative defense.75 The rule also requires a
defendant to identify the entity, if known.76
A plaintiff may wish to apportion fault to a nonparty who is
jointly and severally liable with the defendant, such as its employee.
A defendant may wish to establish the fault of a nondefendant for the
purpose of reducing its own share and proportionate fault.77 "[T]he
person at fault is not liable to the plaintiff-the plaintiff has made no
claim against him or her-but his or her fault nevertheless operates to
reduce the 'proportionate share' of damages that the plaintiff can
recover from those against whom the plaintiff has claimed."7" Thus,
the locus of the burden to plead and prove nonparty fault is dependent
upon the circumstances.
72. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1).
73. See Adcox v. Children's Orthopedic Hosp., 123 Wash. 2d 15, 25, 864 P.2d 921, 928
(1993).
74. Mailloux v. State Farm Ins., 76 Wash. App. 507, 511, 887 P.2d 449, 452 (1994).
75. See WASH. Civ. R. 12(i) (1996-97). The rule provides:
Nonparty at Fault. Whenever a defendant or a third party defendant intends to daim
for purposes of RCW 4.22.070(1) that a nonparty is at fault, such claim is an
affirmative defense which shall be affirmatively pleaded by the party making the claim.
The identity of a nonparty claimed to be at fault, if known to the party making the
claim, shall also be affirmatively pleaded.
Id.
76. See WASH. CIv. R. 12(i) (1996-97); see also Henderson v. Tyrell, 80 Wash. App. 592,
625, 910 P.2d 522, 541 (1996) (holding that defendant's failure to affirmatively plead nonparty
fault precluded introduction of such evidence at trial).
77. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1).
78. Mailloux, 76 Wash. App. at 512, 887 P.2d at 452.
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There is still some uncertainty as to whether a fault-free plaintiff
could settle with a defendant, and establish procedural joint and several
liability between the settling defendant and the remaining defendants,
by using the device of retaining the settling defendant as a party.
Examples of possible procedures might include a loan receipt agree-
ment, the entry of a covenant not to enforce, or a covenant not to
execute a judgment, all of which would leave a settling defendant as a
party. Judgment could later be entered against the settling defendant
and the nonsettling defendants, and procedural joint and several
liability could arguably arise under subsection (1)(b) of the 1996
Act. 79
A contrary and more forceful argument can be made that the
settling defendant has been "released" by the plaintiff,"0 or has an
individual defense, or is immune from liability because the plaintiff
cannot recover any money from that defendant. The 1986 Act
provides that "[j]udgment shall be entered against each defendant
except those who have been released by the claimant or are immune
from liability to the claimant[,]" or who have prevailed on an
individual defense.8 1 Thus, the 1986 Act does not authorize a
judgment to be entered against an immune or released defendant, or
one with a defense. Alternatively, it can be argued that a "judgment"
(as that term is used in the 1986 Act) with real, adverse consequences
has not been entered.82 Such a hollow judgment cannot create joint
and several liability.
D. Third-Party Practice
The 1986 Act strongly suggests that third-party practice under
Washington's Civil Rules is improper in most cases. The impleader
procedure under this rule involves a defendant filing a "third-party"
complaint (here, for contribution) against a stranger to the suit, and
79. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b).
80. In Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wash. 2d 911, 918, 541 P.2d 365, 370 (1975), the court held that
a covenant not to execute judgment between the plaintiff and a defendant was in actuality a
binding settlement and required that defendant's dismissal from the case as no "justiciable
controversy remained between him and the plaintiff." See also J. Michael Philips, Looking out for
Mary Carter: Collusive Settlement Agreements in Washington Tort Litigation, 69 WASH. L. REV.
255 (1995). But see Jensen v. Beaird, 40 Wash. App 1, 9-10, 696 P.2d 612, 618 (1985)
(concluding that "loan receipt" agreement between the plaintiff and one defendant was valid and
enforceable, and was not a release).
81. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1).
82. See Sisk, supra note 22, at 50-53.
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thus making it a party.8 3 A third-party complaint may only name as
a defendant a nonparty "who is or may be liable" to the defendant/
third-party plaintiff.8 4 However, a condition precedent to the right
of contribution is the existence of joint and several liability.8" And,
a third-party defendant cannot be jointly and severally liable with a
third-party plaintiff/defendant, unless an employment or agency
relationship exists, or concerted action has occurred. Thus, a prima
facie element of a contribution cause of action is usually absent.
The contribution statute was enacted in 1981 when joint and
several liability was the rule, not the exception. The 1986 Act altered
that situation and significantly undermined the underlying basis-and
the need-for a claim of contribution. Such a claim requires not only
joint and several liability, but also requires the party to pay another
person's share of liability.8 6 Since a defendant will generally never
pay more than its proportionate share, there will be no need for a
defendant to sue another tortfeasor for having overpaid.
Filing a third-party complaint against another tortfeasor cannot
create procedural7 joint and several liability. The 1986 Act indicates
that judgment is entered only against "each defendant" and the courts
have held accordingly.88 The Act uses the term "third-party defen-
dants" in the very sentence in which it states that judgment shall be
entered only against "defendants."8 9  It is, therefore, fairly obvious
that the legislature intended to exclude third-party defendants from
joint and several liability under the procedural exception.9" "A person
83. See WASH. Civ. R. 14(a) (1996-97). The rule provides in pertinent part:
When Defendant May Bring in Third Party. At any time after commencement of the
action a defending party, as a third party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint
to be served upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for
all or part of the plaintiffs claim against him.
Id.
84. WASH. CIV. R. 14(a).
85. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(1).
86. Id.
87. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b).
88. See Anderson, 123 Wash. 2d at 850, 873 P.2d at 491; Gerrard, 122 Wash. 2d at 292, 857
P.2d at 1035; Washburn, 120 Wash. 2d at 294, 840 P.2d at 886.
89. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1).
90. See Anderson, 123 Wash. 2d at 852, 873 P.2d at 492 ("a defendant against whom
judgment is entered, as that term is used in RCW § 4.22.070(1)(b), must be a named defendant
in the case when the court enters its final judgment" (emphasis added)); Gerrard, 122 Wash. 2d at
298, 857 P.2d at 1038-39; and Washburn, 120 Wash. 2d at 294, 840 P.2d at 886; see also Cooper
v. Viking Ventures, 53 Wash. App. 739, 745, 770 P.2d 659, 662 (1989) (affirming imposition of
sanctions under Wash. Civ. R. 11 for defendant's refusal to dismiss "frivolous" third-party
complaint for contribution and indemnification against another defendant who had settled with
the plaintiff).
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is not liable to the plaintiff at all, much less jointly and severally, if he
or she has not been named by the plaintiff."'9 This can change only
if the plaintiff amends the complaint and asserts a direct claim against
the third-party defendant. Therefore, a third-party complaint for
contribution does not have a good faith basis to be filed in cases
involving the procedural joint and several liability exception.92
This rule is the same in other jurisdictions which have adopted
contribution statutes. In Pyramid Condominium Ass'n v. Morgan,93 the
court considered the question under Maryland law.94  Two tort
defendants filed third-party complaints for contribution against a
number of companies whom the plaintiff had not sued in the federal
court diversity action.9 The plaintiff had, however, sued these third-
party defendants in a separate state court action. 96
The third-party defendants' motion to dismiss the contribution
claims was granted.97 The Morgan court noted that jurisdictional
requirements barred the plaintiff from suing the third-party defendants
in federal court.9 Therefore, the third-party defendant could never
be directly liable to the plaintiff in that lawsuit. 99
Because the third-party defendant companies could not be liable
to the plaintiff, they likewise could not have any "derivative" liability
for contribution.' 0 "When a plaintiff has no right of action against
a third-party, there can be no contribution entitling the defendant to
join the third party as a defendant under the Uniform [Contribution
Among Tortfeasors] Act, notwithstanding the fact that liability under
the Act may be joint or several."''1 1
The rule disallowing a third-party complaint for contribution is
particularly appropriate under Washington's statutory scheme, which
requires third-party defendants to be "defendants against whom
91. Mailloux, 76 Wash. App. at 513, 887 P.2d at 452.
92. Note that this would apply only to procedural joint and several liability cases under
subsection (1)(b), and not to factual joint and several cases under subsection (1)(a). See WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 4.22.070(1)(a) and (1)(b). Factual joint and several liability can arise whether
certain tortfeasors are even made party to the suit. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a).
93. 606 F. Supp. 592 (D. Md. 1985).
94. See id.
95. See id. at 594.
96. See id.
97. See Morgan, 606 F. Supp. at 599.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 598.
100. See id.
101. Morgan, 606 F. Supp. at 598.
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judgment is entered" before procedural joint and several liability will
arise. 102
An employee/agent does not have to be a party-defendant to
create joint and several liability for its employer/principal under the
factual exception."3 An employer/principal may have a legal basis
to bring a third-party suit for contribution against an employee/agent.
This will not of course relieve the employer/principal of its vicarious
liability; it will, however, result in the employee/agent also being found
liable. 0 4
Strategically, "filling the empty chair" by way of impleading a
nonparty tortfeasor is often foolhardy. First, the nonparty tortfeasor
is an "entity" to whom fault can be apportioned.'0 5 Defendants are
not liable for the shares of nonparty entities, unless they are agents,
employers or concerted actors.'0 6 Thus, if the plaintiff is fault free
and amends the complaint to make a direct claim against the third-
party defendant, the defendant who impleads another tortfeasor has
done nothing more than create joint and several liability where it
previously did not exist.
Secondly, filling the empty chair brings an attorney into the
courtroom to argue that the third-party defendant is not at fault, but
rather that the defendant is. Otherwise, the empty chair would have
had no one to "defend" it but the plaintiff, whose recovery will be
diminished proportionately by any fault assigned to the empty
chair. 107 A plaintiff would typically prefer to present its case-in-chief
against the defendant without having to worry about defending empty
chair entities. The quality and sequence of the plaintiffs presentation
is often compromised. Furthermore, a savvy plaintiff's attorney takes
much pleasure in watching tortfeasors blame each other in front of the
jury.
E. Reasonableness Hearings
Reasonableness hearings are a creature of the Tort Reform Act of
1981. These are essentially evidentiary hearings to determine whether,
based upon various judicially determined factors, an amount paid by
102. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b).
103. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a).
104. See id.
105. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1).
106. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) and (1)(a).
107. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1).
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a defendant in settlement was "reasonable."' 8 They serve two basic
purposes: (1) to establish the right to contribution of a jointly and
severally liable defendant settling under the 1981 Act;'09 and (2) to
establish the right of a nonsettling, jointly and severally liable
defendant to obtain a "credit," or reduction of its judgment obligation,
for the reasonable amount paid by a settling defendant.110 They
serve to prohibit the manipulation of the value of a case by settling
parties to the detriment of the nonsettling defendant."'
The requirement of the reasonableness hearing was enacted in
1981-at a time when joint and several liability was the rule, not the
exception. 112 Five years later, the exact opposite occurred; joint and
several liability became the exception, not the rule. But, as with the
contribution statute, the provision for reasonableness hearings was not
accordingly revised in 1986."' This is likely because both retain
some limited application. Our Supreme Court recently stated that a
decision on the continuing necessity of such hearings "must await
another day. '
The requirement for a reasonableness hearing is tied to the right
of contribution. Both are founded upon the assumption that joint and
several liability exists. In Waite v. Morisette,"' the court concluded
that a nonsettling defendant who is not jointly and severally liable is
not entitled to a credit for amounts paid by settling defendants. 116 At
issue was the continuing effect of the offset provision and the
reasonableness hearing requirement of the 1981 Act after the passage
of the 1986 Act." 7
108. See, e.g., Glover v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 98 Wash. 2d 708, 715-18, 658 P.2d 1230,
1235-36 (1983).
109. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(2)(b) (1996).
110. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(2) (1996). See, e.g., Stout v. State, 60 Wash. App.
527, 803 P.2d 1352, (1991) (pre-19 8 6 Tort Reform Act case reducing jury verdict against
nonsettling defendant by amounts paid by settling defendants).
111. See Adams v. Johnston, 71 Wash. App. 599, 604, 860 P.2d 423, 426 (1993), review
denied, 124 Wash. 2d 1020 (1994); Philip A. Talmadge, Washington's Product Liability Act, 5 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 19 (1981).
112. 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 27, § 14 (codified as amended in WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060
(1996)).
113. See 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 305, § 100-912.
114. Washburn, 120 Wash. 2d at 298, 840 P.2d at 888.
115. 68 Wash. App. 521, 843 P.2d 1121 (1993).
116. See id.
117. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(1) (1996). The statute provides:
A party prior to entering into a release, covenant not to sue, covenant not to enforce
judgment, or similar agreement with a claimant shall give five days' written notice of
such intent to all other parties and the court. The court may for good cause authorize
a shorter notice period. The notice shall contain a copy of the proposed agreement. A
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The Waite court concluded that the 1986 Act "established
proportionate liability" with the limited exceptions of where defendants
act in concert, a person acts as an agent or servant of a party, or a
claimant is not at fault. 1 8 The court went on to say that the reason-
ableness hearing provision of the 1981 Act is only applicable to those
few exceptions to proportionate liability contained in the 1986 Act."9
Accordingly, neither an offset nor a reasonableness hearing is required
unless joint and several liability exists.
If each defendant pays only its proportionate share, there is no
need for an offset, or for a reasonableness hearing.12 The jury
apportions fault to settling defendants, and this process acts as the
reasonableness hearing. Although the plaintiff shoulders the risk of
settling "low," he also receives the benefit of settling "high.''
F. Summary
Based loosely on the Uniform Comparative Fault Act,122 the
1986 Tort Reform Act brought fundamental changes to the way that
we litigate tort cases, especially those involving multiple defendants.
One must have a basic understanding of how this Act operates to make
intelligent strategic decisions. The fundamental premise is that, in
most cases, a defendant will never pay more than its proportionate share
of fault for a plaintiff s injuries. Nonetheless, defendants continue to
file cross-claims and third-party complaints against each other for
contribution and/or indemnity. That tort defendants continue this
unnecessary internecine litigation is confounding.
hearing shall be held on the issue of the reasonableness of the amount to be paid with
all parties afforded an opportunity to present evidence. A determination by the court
that the amount to be paid is reasonable must be secured. If an agreement was entered
into prior to the filing of an action, a hearing on the issue of the reasonableness of the
amount paid at the time it was entered into may be held at any time prior to final
judgment upon motion of a party.
The burden of proof regarding the reasonableness of the settlement offer shall be
on the party requesting the settlement.
Id.
118. See Waite, 68 Wash. App. at 524-25, 843 P.2d at 1123; see also WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.22.070(1)(a) and (1)(b).
119. See Waite, 68 Wash. App. at 525, 843 P.2d at 1124.
120. "The 1986 Tort Reform Act substantially limits the number of cases in which a
reasonableness hearing will be held." See Brewer v. Fibreboard, 127 Wash. 2d 512, 540 n.76, 901
P.2d 297, 312 n.6 (1995) (Talmadge, J. dissenting) (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070).
121. See Waite, 68 Wash. App. at 527, 843 P.2d at 1124 (reasoning that "symmetry"
requires that if the disadvantage of settlement is the plaintiffs, so ought the advantage be). See
also Washburn, 120 Wash. 2d at 297, 840 P.2d at 888.
122. 1977 UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. § 127-53 (1996).
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Realistically, even if a judgment is joint and several in nature,
under custom and practice in Washington each defendant (or its
insurance carrier) will usually pay no more than its (or its insured's)
share. If there are no assets or insurance for the plaintiff to collect, the
question arises as to why a defendant would waste time and money
pursuing an insolvent defendant for contribution. If the plaintiff could
get no money from this person, it is unlikely that a defendant will be
more successful. Obviously, exceptions to this custom can arise123
and contribution will be a significant tool in those limited contexts.
In the unlikely event that a jointly and severally liable defendant
is actually forced to pay another defendant's share of damages, a
contribution action can still be filed up to a year after payment or entry
of judgment.124 A defendant can seek a judgment for a contribution
claim upon motion in the original action. 121
This Article will now explore what defendants might do in the
unlikely event that joint and several liability exists, and they are forced
to pay another person's share of liability. There are three theories
under which one tortfeasor might pursue another tortfeasor for
reimbursement of a payment made to an injured person on the second
tortfeasor's behalf: contribution, indemnification, and subrogation. 126
123. Examples include a "vindictive" plaintiff who insists upon one target defendant paying
the entire judgment, or a defendant who has nonliquid assets that would be difficult to execute
upon. Thus, the plaintiff leaves this difficulty to the other defendant.
124. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.050(3) (1996). The statute provides:
If a judgment has been rendered, the action for contribution must be commenced within
one year after the judgment becomes final. If no judgment has been rendered, the
person bringing the action for contribution either must have (a) discharged by payment
the common liability within the period of the statute of limitations applicable to the
claimant's right of action against him and commenced the action for contribution within
one year after payment, or (b) agreed while the action was pending to discharge the
common liability and, within one year after the agreement, have paid the liability and
commenced an action for contribution.
Id.
125. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.050(1) provides: "If the comparative fault of the parties to
a claim for contribution has been established previously by the court in the original action, a party
paying more than that party's equitable share of the obligation, upon motion, may recover
judgment for contribution."
126. The three theories of reimbursement addressed are based in equity. Not addressed
herein is the more common contractual subrogation claim brought pursuant to a contract, usually
an insurance policy. These claims are generally initiated by an injured party's insurer-as
opposed to a tortfeasor. Nor will this article address contractual indemnification cases, which
usually arise in the construction or business context. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.115
(1996); Moen Co. v. Island Steel Erectors, Inc., 128 Wash. 2d 745, 762, 912 P.2d 472, 481
(1996); Brown v. Prime Constr. Co. Inc., 102 Wash. 2d 235, 684 P.2d 73 (1984) (holding that
an indemnification agreement in a construction contract, negotiated pursuant to WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.24.115, is valid and enforceable, notwithstanding the provisions of WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.22.070).
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This Article then concludes that statutory contribution is the only
legal theory under which one actively negligent torifeasor might sue
another actively negligent tortfeasor for reimbursement of a sum paid
to an injured party. As between a passively negligent tortfeasor (an
employer or principal) and an actively negligent tortfeasor (its
employee or agent), either a right of contribution or equitable
subrogation exists. But because contribution is an adequate statutory
remedy, the courts will not resort to equity to fashion a subrogation
remedy. Lastly, implied indemnification is no longer an option as it
was abolished by the 1981 Act.
II. EQUITABLE REMEDIES As BETWEEN TORTFEASORS:
CONTRIBUTION, INDEMNIFICATION, AND SUBROGATION
The doctrines of contribution, indemnification, and subrogation
are all founded in equity. These doctrines were created to allow a
person who paid the debt of another to obtain restitution from the
debtor. Each doctrine is potentially applicable to the situation of a tort
defendant who has been forced to pay the share of another tortfeasor.
A. Contribution
The Tort Reform Act of 1981 created a clear but somewhat
limited statutory right of contribution.1 17  The fundamental under-
pinning of this right-which is based largely on Sections 4, 5, and 6 of
the 1977 Uniform Comparative Fault Act"2 --is the existence of joint
and several liability.'29 This was largely eliminated by the 1986 Act.
Thus, the right of contribution is of somewhat dubious usefulness in
present tort litigation, since defendants will in most circumstances, pay
only their proportionate share. The process of seeking contribution is
described as follows: "Under the principle of 'contribution,' a
tortfeasor against whom a judgment is rendered is entitled to recover
proportional shares of judgment from other joint tortfeasors whose
127. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22.040 and .050 (1996).
128. 12 U.L.A. §§ 4-6, 143-47 (1996). See also 1981 Journal of the Washington Senate,
Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Tort and Product Liability Reform [Draft], at 627-28
(hereinafter Final Report).
129. The two fundamental conditions precedent to a right of contribution are joint and
several liability with another tortfeasor, and payment of more than one's own share. WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.22.040(1) and .050; see also Gerrard v. Craig, 122 Wash. 2d 288, 292-93, 857 P.2d
1033, 1035-36 (1993) (no right of contribution in the procedural joint and several liability context
of WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b), unless a judgment has actually been entered); Glass v.
Stahl Specialty Co., 97 Wash. 2d 883, 887, 652 P.2d 948, 952 (1982) ("Where there is no joint
and several liability, there is no right of contribution.").
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negligence contributed to the injury and who were also liable to the
plaintiff." 30
Contribution is directed at "equitably distributing between or
among tortfeasors the responsibility for paying those damages suffered
by the injured party."131  As will be discussed below, the right to
contribution was not recognized at common law in Washington until
the statutory cause of action was created by the 1981 Act. Thus, the
sole remedy is the statutory right of contribution.
The authors of the Restatement have observed that only nine
states continue to follow the common law no-contribution rule, and of
these, "the last three [including Washington] have changed the rule of
joint and several liability and opted for apportioned liability among
tortfeasors, so there is no occasion for contribution."'32  Therefore,
Washington's contribution statute "is in derogation of the common law
and .. .must be strictly construed."'33 A party seeking contribution
must clearly establish each and every statutory element or the
contribution claim must fail.' 34
While a judgment is not necessarily a condition precedent to an
action for contribution, 35 one may be required to establish joint and
several liability. 6 Assuming that joint and several liability can arise
without the entry of a judgment, a defendant may settle a claim with
a plaintiff and then pursue other entities for contribution. 3 7 Howev-
er, the settling party must extinguish the liability of the nonsettling
person, and the amount paid must be "reasonable."'138 A court may
decide that the amount paid in settlement was not reasonable (namely,
in excess of what was reasonable). 9 Although this will not vitiate
a settlement, the amount which the court later decides would have been
130. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 328 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Dawson v. Contractors
Transport Corp., 467 F.2d 727, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
131. Wenatchee Wenoka Growers Ass'n v. Krack Corp., 89 Wash. 2d 847, 850, 576 P.2d
388, 390 (1978) (emphasis added).
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A, at 197 (1979) (emphasis added). See also
Thomas V. Harris, Washington's Unique Approach to Partial Tort Settlements: The Modified Pro
Tanto Credit and the Reasonableness Hearing Requirement, 20 GONZ. L. REV. 69, 108 n.137 (1984)
("In fact, it is the doctrine of joint and several liability itself that produces the need for both the
right to contribution and a settlement credit.").
133. Bunce Rental v. Clark Equip., 42 Wash. App. 644, 646, 713 P.2d 128, 130 (1986)
(citing WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22.040 and .050).
134. See id.
135. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.050(3).
136. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(b).
137. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22.040(2) and .050(3).
138. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(2).
139. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(1).
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reasonable acts to set a limit on how much the nonsettling defendant
may be required to pay in contribution. 40
The 1986 Act also provides that if a defendant is jointly and
severally liable under subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b),"' a defendant's right
to contribution against another jointly and severally liable defen-
dant-and the effect of one defendant's settlement-is determined
under the 1981 Act. 42 The 1986 Legislature likely contemplated
that the right to contribution (created by the 1981 Tort Reform Act)
retains significance only when joint and several liability exists, which
is now only rarely.
Washington's Supreme Court has ruled that, under the procedural
form of joint and several liability, (1) a settling defendant cannot be
jointly and severally liable with a nonsettling defendant, (2) a
defendant who has been dismissed based on an affirmative defense is
not jointly and severally liable with a remaining defendant and is not
subject to a claim for contribution, and (3) a defendant is not jointly
and severally liable with a defendant who has been voluntarily
dismissed.'43  Thus, a right to contribution does not have any
application in procedural joint and several liability prejudgment cases
and, as explained above, has little practical impact in post-judgment
situations.
Thus, contribution has continuing vitality in only two situations:
first, where factual joint and several liability exists under subsection
(1)(a) 1. and, second, in those three situations where common law
joint and several liability continues to exist.145
Factual joint and several liability may exist even without the entry
of a judgment. This could arise where a defendant is jointly and
severally liable with a party (or nonparty) employee/agent or with a co-
conspirator. 146  Although vicarious liability was created to assure full
recovery for injured parties, primary liability rests with the employee/
agent. A plaintiff may be required to first seek recovery from the
employee/agent and pursue the "additional security" of the employer/
principal only if those efforts fail. 47
140. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(2).
141. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22.070(1)(a) and (1)(b).
142. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.22.040-.060.
143. See Anderson, 123 Wash. 2d at 850, 873 P.2d at 491; Gerrard, 122 Wash. 2d at 292,
857 P.2d at 1035; Washburn, 120 Wash. 2d at 294, 840 P.2d at 886.
144. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a).
145. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(3) (1996).
146. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a).
147. See, e.g., Marshall v. Chapman's Estate, 31 Wash. 2d 137, 144, 195 P.2d 656, 660
(1948); Glover v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 98 Wash. 2d 708, 720, 658 P.2d 1230, 1237 (1983).
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Conversely, an employee/agent cannot sue its employer/principal
for contribution if the latter's liability is only vicarious. 4 ' This rule
makes good sense, as a primarily liable tortfeasor should not be allowed
to shift the entire burden of a loss he or she caused to the secondarily
liable principal.
In many situations, an employer/principal may not wish to or
may be legally precluded from seeking contribution from its employee/
agent. Under current law, the officers, employees or volunteers of a
city,149 county, 5° or state ' agency are entitled to a publicly-
paid defense of any civil action brought against them and arising from
their acts or omissions while performing, or in good faith purporting
to perform, their official duties. Public employees are likewise entitled
to indemnification by their government employer for any judgment
taken against them."2 Because the Washington Legislature has made
a policy decision to provide "coverage" for all government workers so
long as they act within the scope of their employment, a vicariously
liable public employer would be unable to seek contribution from its
employee.
Similarly, many privately held businesses have defense-provision
and judgment-indemnification employment policies which lead to the
same result. Some companies that do not have such policies, nonethe-
less, have employment contracts with like provisions for certain
personnel. These arrangements are a sound business practice. Being
vicariously liable, companies realize that tort victims will more than
likely pursue them for compensation, in addition to possibly naming
their employee.
At issue here is how much an employer gives up financially by
agreeing not to pursue contribution from its employee, compared to
how much it benefits in morale and efficiency by "backing up" its
workers. A suit for contribution against an employee would obviously
destroy an employment relationship (often the relationship between a
principal and an agent is not so close and this factor is not as
148. See Gass v. MacPherson's, Inc., 79 Wash. App. 65, 71, 899 P.2d 1325, 1328 (1995)
("As between the principal and the agent, the comparative fault of the agent is 100 percent."); see
also, WASH. REV. CODE 4.22.040(1) (the court "may determine that two or more persons are to
be treated as a single person for purposes of contribution"); Erlich v. First Nat'l Bank of
Princeton, 505 A.2d 220, 243 (N.J. Super. 1984) (treating employer and employee as "a single
tortfeasor" and thus precluding the employee's contribution action).
149. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.96.041 (1996).
150. See id.
151. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.92.060 and .070.
152. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.96.041(2) (local government employees); and WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.92.075 (1996) (state employees).
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compelling). Given how seldom an employer might actually exercise
a right of contribution, providing a defense and indemnification will
usually outweigh the alternative. Thus, as a practical matter,
contribution in this context has little utility.
Lastly, contribution, as with indemnification and subrogation, is
derivative in nature. That is, whoever sues derives their claim from
someone else. If no viable original claim exists, a derivative action
would be barred. A contribution-defendant can raise any defense
against a contribution-plaintiff which it would have against the injured
party. In Glass v. Stahl Specialty Co.," s3 the court held that there is
no right of contribution against a tortfeasor when that tortfeasor would
be immune from a suit brought directly against it by the injured
party.154
B. Indemnification
The doctrine of indemnity is based on the same equitable
underpinnings as contribution, and upon unjust enrichment."5 '
However, in contrast to contribution's proportional distribution of the
loss, indemnification is an all-or-nothing proposition. One entitled to
indemnification transfers the entire burden of the loss to the other
tortfeasor. 116
Stated otherwise, contribution is a fault-sharing mechanism, while
indemnity is fault-shifting."7 For example, a principal who pays a
judgment based on the negligence of an agent might seek indemnifica-
tion for the entire amount of the judgment from the agent. Note that
such a suit formerly was allowed under one of the exceptions to the
general rule prohibiting indemnification."5 8 However, this cause of
action was abolished by the 1981 Act because it created a right of
contribution in its place. 9
153. 97 Wash. 2d 883, 652 P.2d 948 (1982).
154. See id. at 887, 652 P.2d at 952; see also Horton v. United States, 622 F.2d 80, 83 (4th
Cir. 1980) (stating that there was no right of contribution against State of South Carolina because
such action is derivative of injured party's right to maintain action against state, a right barred
by sovereign immunity); Hill v. United States, 453 F.2d 839, 842 (6th Cir. 1972) (stating that
contribution claim is derivative of injured party's claim and no such right existed against the State
of Tennessee because sovereign immunity precluded the injured party from suing state directly).
155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886(BX1) (1979).
156. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 51, at 341.
157. See Zamora v. Mobil Oil, 104 Wash. 2d 211, 218-19, 704 P.2d 591, 596 (1985) (citing
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 51, at 310 (4th
ed. 1971)).
158. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886(B)(2) (1979).
159. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(3).
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C. Subrogation
"Subrogation is the substitution of one person for another, so that
he may succeed to the rights a creditor in relation to the debt or claim.
... 160 Subrogation is defined as "[t]he right of one who has paid
an obligation which another should have paid to be indemnified by the
other."' 61  "[It is] a device adopted by equity to compel ultimate
discharge of an obligation by him who in good conscience ought to pay
it."' 162  Equity substitutes the subrogee in place of the creditor
"without any express agreement .... 163 In addition, "[s]ubrogation
is an equitable doctrine, the purpose of which is to avoid unjust
enrichment."'" Indeed, subrogation is a "corollary of the underlying
theory of unjust enrichment ....
Subrogation can also arise out of contract. 166 The most common
type of subrogation claim is that made by an insurer against a third-
party tortfeasor to recover monies the company paid to its insured
because of the tortfeasor's negligence-the well-known "subro" claim.
Generally, because the insurance policy has a subrogation clause the
claim is for contractual subrogation. Nonetheless, the Washington
Supreme Court recently concluded that equitable subrogation can apply
in the insurance "subrogation" claim: "Usually, subrogation allows an
insurer to recover what it pays to an insured under a policy by suing
the wrongdoer. The insurer steps 'into the shoes' of its insured. The
insurer, the 'subrogee,' [sic] has rights equal to, but no greater than,
those of the injured party.' "167 This fact-pattern is not our concern
as it involves a claim by the tort victim (actually its subrogee) against
a tortfeasor, rather than a claim by a tortfeasor.
160. Newcomer v. Masini, 45 Wash. App. 284, 286, 724 P.2d 1122, 1124 (1986).
161. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1427 (6th Ed. 1990).
162. See id.
163. Newcomer, 45 Wash. App. at 286, 724 P.2d at 1124.
164. Touchet Valley v. Opp & Seibold Constr., 119 Wash. 2d 334, 341, 831 P.2d 724, 728
(1992); see also Lynch v. Deaconess Medical Center, 113 Wash. 2d 162, 166, 776 P.2d 681, 683
(1989) (citations omitted).
165. Newcomer, 45 Wash. App. at 286, 724 P.2d at 1124; see also 73 AM. JUR. 2d,
Subrogation § 4; Touchet Valley, 119 Wash. 2d at 341, 831 P.2d at 728.
166. See Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Wash. 2d 409, 417, 693 P.2d 697, 702
(1985).
167. See Touchet Valley, 119 Wash. 2d at 341, 831 P.2d at 728. The courts have recognized,
however, that the equitable principles of subrogation are subject to alteration by either legislative
enactment or an agreement between the parties. See Paulsen v. Dept. Soc. and Health Svc., 78
Wash. App. 665, 672, 898 P.2d 353, 356 (1995), review denied, 128 Wash. 2d 1010 (1996); Fisher
v. Aldi Tire, Inc., 78 Wash. App. 902, 908, 902 P.2d 166, 169 (1995), review denied, 128 Wash.
2d 1025 (1996).
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"Subrogation exists only as a three-party transaction, where the
subrogee is answering for the debt of another."' 16  "A person cannot
seek subrogation for paying one's own debt."' 69  By making the
payment, the person making the payment (subrogee) is subrogated to
the rights of the injured party-even though he has "no primary
liability."' 7 As the court has stated,
[g]enerally speaking, 'the essential elements necessary for legal
subrogation .. . are: (1) the existence of a debt or obligation for
which a party, other than the subrogee, is primarily liable, which (2)
the subrogee, who is neither a volunteer nor an intermeddler, pays
or discharges in order to protect his own rights and interests.'"7'
It has been held that the subrogee "steps into the shoes" of the
injured party.172 The subrogee can stand in no better position than
did the plaintiff. 73
Subrogation, "is based upon the principle of indemnity but is an
exclusively derivative remedy which depends upon the claim of the
insured and is subject to whatever defenses the tortfeasor has against
the insured.""' Thus, if a suit by the plaintiff against the tortfeasor
would have been barred by the statute of limitations, immunity, or any
other defense, a suit by the subrogee against the tortfeasor should
likewise fail.
The continued vitality of equitable subrogation after the 1986 Act
is an open question. Newcomer v. Masini"'7 is a case that was
decided based on the law as it existed after the 1981 Act but before the
1986 Act. 7 6 In this author's experience, Newcomer is often cited at
the trial level as authority for the now-suspect proposition that a
tortfeasor may seek reimbursement under a theory other than
contribution, namely, subrogation. A careful examination of the
decision is required to establish that its ultimate holding was substan-
tially undermined by the 1986 Act.
168. Livingston v. Shelton, 85 Wash. 2d 615, 618, 537 P.2d 774, 776 (1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 958 (1976).
169. See id. at 620, 537 P.2d at 777.
170. See Newcomer, 45 Wash. App. at 288, 724 P.2d at 1125.
171. Livingston, 85 Wash. 2d at 618-19, 537 P.2d at 776 (quoting Lawyers Title Ins. Corp.
v. Edmar Constr. Co., 294 A.2d 865, 869 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972).
172. See Timms v. James, 28 Wash. App. 76, 80, 621 P.2d 798, 800 (1980).
173. See id. at 79-80, 621 P.2d at 800.
174. Great American Ins. Co. v. United States, 575 F.2d 1031, 1034 (2d Cir. 1978).
175. 45 Wash. App. 284, 724 P.2d 1122 (1986).
176. See id.
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The court in Newcomer held that an alleged tortfeasor who had
paid the entirety of an injured party's claim was entitled to pursue a
third-party complaint for equitable subrogation against a concurrent
tortfeasor, against whom the plaintiff had never brought a direct
claim. 177
The plaintiff, while driving a snowmobile, was injured by a
motorist. 178 The motorist had lost control of his truck on a moun-
tain pass while attempting to avoid a second snowmobile driven by the
plaintiffs close friend.179  The plaintiff apparently chose not to sue
his friend (who caused the accident) and sued the motorist instead.'
The motorist then filed a third-party complaint against the second
snowmobiler for contribution, and later for equitable subrogation.'8 '
The motorist paid the limits of his insurance policy and settled with
the plaintiff.'82 He obtained the release of himself and of the other
snowmobiler.'83 The motorist (third-party plaintiff) then pursued his
third-party complaint against the other snowmobiler (third-party
defendant).'84 At trial, the jury found that the motorist was not
negligent, and that the second snowmobiler was 100 percent at fault for
the plaintiffs injuries.8 5
The Court of Appeals in Newcomer overcame a number of
seemingly significant hurdles in order to reach the subrogation claim,
which the court said was "[a]llowed liberally in the interests of justice
and equity . . ."186 The most significant holding in Newcomer
provides that one who settles a suit under the threat of civil litigation
does not make payment "voluntarily," even if he is later exonerated by
a jury."' The court reasoned that although the motorist (defendant/
third-party plaintiff) was ultimately found to be fault-free, "[hie was
a defendant to the lawsuit and, until the case was decided, might have
been determined to be liable for an amount substantially in excess of
his insurance coverage. ''l88
177. See id.
178. See id. at 285, 724 P.2d at 1125.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See Newcomer, 45 Wash. App. at 285-86, 724 P.2d at 1124.
182. See id. at 285, 724 P.2d at 1124.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 286, 724 P.2d at 1124.
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. See Newcomer, 45 Wash. App. at 288-89, 724 P.2d at 1125-26.
188. Id. at 289, 724 P.2d at 1126.
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This conclusion was likely undermined by the general abolition of
joint and several liability of the Tort Reform Act of 1986. In
Newcomer, the defendant would have been jointly and severally liable
with the third-party defendant under then-existing common law
principles. However, pursuant to the 1986 Act, these tortfeasors would
never be jointly and severally liable, unless the plaintiff amended his
complaint to bring a direct claim against the third-party defendant. "A
person is not liable to the plaintiff at all, much less jointly and
severally, if he or she has not been named by the plaintiff."' 89
Additionally, the plaintiff would now have to be found fault-free, and
a judgment would need to be entered against both at-fault defen-
dants. 190
Under current law, a third-party defendant's argument that the
payment by a third-party plaintiff to the plaintiff was "voluntary" in
such circumstances is much stronger. That is, a third-party plaintiff
would have no legal reason to pay anything more than its proportionate
share of fault, and would only be paying its own debt-an act for
which subrogation is not available.
This particular holding in Newcomer (that potential liability
suffices) distinguishes subrogation from indemnity, which requires
proof of "actual liability."' 91 This holding likewise distinguishes
subrogation from contribution, which requires actual joint and several
liability.'92 The subrogee's right of reimbursement extends only to
the payment of a debt actually owed.'93
Because the subrogee stands in the shoes of the plaintiff, if the
subrogee pays the plaintiff for the debt of another tortfeasor--disre-
garding a defense the tortfeasor would have had to a suit brought by
the plaintiff-the payment is "voluntary" and subrogation is disal-
lowed.194 Further, subrogation may not be sought unless the debt
has been "wholly discharged.' 9
Under the Tort Reform Act of 1986, a defendant cannot be jointly
and severally liable with a third-party defendant; 196 and therefore, a
189. Mailloux, 76 Wash. App. at 513, 887 P.2d at 452.
190. See Anderson, 123 Wash. 2d at 850, 873 P.2d at 491; Washburn, 120 Wash. 2d at 292,
840 P.2d at 885.
191. See Newcomer, 45 Wash. App. at 288, 724 P.2d at 1125.
192. See id. at 286, 724 P.2d at 1124; WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(1)(b); see also Gerrard
v. Craig, 122 Wash. 2d 288, 292, 857 P.2d 1033, 1035 (1993).
193. Timms v. James, 28 Wash. App. 76, 80, 621 P.2d 798, 800 (1980).
194. See id.
195. See Chapman v. Ross, 152 Wash. 262, 265, 277 P. 854, 855 (1929).
196. There can be no liability with a nonparty unless the nonparty is an agent or employee
acting within the scope of their duties, or has acted in concert with the named defendant. See
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payment made in circumstances similar to Newcomer would likely be
considered voluntary under today's law, such that subrogation would
be precluded. To the extent that Newcomer remains good authority,
it provides a fascinating but largely irrelevant rule of law.
In sum, the decision in Newcomer reflects a fact pattern which is
too infrequent to be useful: an alleged tortfeasor who in reality is not
negligent (one with "clean hands"), agrees to settle the claim or suit
against him, then sues the party who actually caused the injury, and is
subsequently found to be fault-free by the jury. Most defendants who
believe themselves not to be liable would just as soon fight that battle
in a tort suit, rather than settle the action and then be forced to try the
issue of their fault in a contribution suit-at the risk of losing
everything if the jury finds them even one percent at fault.
D. The Common Law Forbids a Right of Action by One Actively
Negligent Tortfeasor as Against Another
1. Contribution Is Not Allowed
Prior to 1981, no right of action existed in this state allowing one
actively negligent joint or concurrent tortfeasor to sue another for the
recovery of monies paid to an injured party. One tortfeasor singled out
by a plaintiff and forced to pay the entirety of the damages, even
though only partly at fault, was simply without a remedy.'97 This
had been a rule of the common law for two centuries.'9"
Public policy in Washington-as with most states-expressly
prohibited a common law action for contribution. 99 A tortfeasor has
no common law right to recover the other tortfeasor's share of the
damages through the doctrine of contribution. The rationale for the
rule was as follows:
The general rule may be found expressed in the maxim that no man
can make his own misconduct the ground for an action in his own
favor. If he suffers because of his own wrongdoing, the law will not
relieve him. The law cannot recognize equities as springing from a
wrong in favor of one concerned in committing it.2 °0
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a).
197. See Doremus v. Root, 23 Wash. 710, 715, 63 Pac. 572, 573 (1901).
198. See Merryweather v. Nizan, 8 T.R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799) (between
joint tortfeasors, there is no right of contribution).
199. See Stahl Specialty Company, 97 Wash. 2d at 883, 652 P.2d at 950; Wenatchee Wenoka
Growers Assoc. v. Krack Corp., 89 Wash. 2d 847, 849, 576 P.2d 388, 389 (1978).
200. 1 COOLEY ON TORTS 254 (3rd ed. 1906) (quoted in Alaska Steamship Co. v. Pacific
Coast Gypsum Co., 71 Wash. 359, 363, 128 Pac. 654, 656 (1912)). This rationale has been
criticized as an "ancient specious argument[.]" KEETON ET AL., supra note 20 § 51, at 341.
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Some years ago, the City of Tacoma brought an action for
contribution against a concurrent tortfeasor whose negligence had
forced it to compensate an injured party.21 The city attempted to
avoid the common law bar by arguing that it was not in pari delicto
with the other tortfeasor. °2 The court disagreed and held the action
barred:
If a public street is maintained by the city in an unsafe or dangerous
condition, and the negligence of a third party combines with that of
the city to cause an injury to such third party, and such injury
would or might not have occurred but for the combined negligence
of the city and the second party, no recovery by either of the joint
wrongdoers may be had against the other. 23
2. Indemnification Is Likewise Not Allowed
The above-stated rationale led to an identical rule barring actions
for indemnification between actively negligent tortfeasors.2°  One's
own wrongdoing bars him from pursuing a joint or concurrent
tortfeasor for indemnification.
Some limited exceptions to this rule were developed. For
example, one whose secondary (or "passive") negligence required him
to pay for the primary (or "active") negligence of another was allowed
to seek indemnification, such as an employer whose only liability was
vicarious.0 5 It was said that these tortfeasors were not "in pari
delicto. "2 6 However, such suits are no longer authorized.0 7
3. Equitable Subrogation Requires "Clean Hands"
The "clean hands" doctrine in the context of a subrogation action
dates back at least to German Bank of Memphis v. United States. 208
In that case, a bank brought an equitable subrogation action against the
U.S. Treasury Department. 2°  The bank, having previously been
found liable for mishandling funds, contended that the Treasury
Department was also negligent.210 The Court held that no right of
201. See City of Tacoma v. Bonnell, 65 Wash. 505, 118 P.2d 642 (1911).
202. See id. at 510, 118 Pac. at 644.
203. Id. at 511, 118 Pac. at 644.
204. See Rufener v. Scott, 46 Wash. 2d 240, 242, 280 P.2d 253, 255 (1955).
205. See id. at 242-43, 280 P.2d at 255.
206. See id. at 242, 280 P.2d at 255.
207. See supra notes 40, 165, infra notes 226-35, and accompanying text.
208. 148 U.S. 573 (1893).
209. See id. at 578.
210. See id.
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equitable subrogation exists when the party seeking it participated in
the negligent conduct.2 ' "It is said that a person who invokes the
doctrine of subrogation must come into court with clean hands. 212
The general rule is that subrogation will be denied for those "who
are themselves guilty of wrong or inequitable conduct.1 213
In WA. Ellis Inc. v. Ellis, 214 the Supreme Court of Colorado
considered the propriety of an equitable subrogation counterclaim in
an action for trespass .2 1  After noting that the party seeking subro-
gation and the party from whom subrogation was sought were both
trespassers, the court concluded, "[t]he rule of subrogation has no
application to joint tortfeasors and equity will give no such relief to a
trespasser. "216
Washington follows the same rule of equity.217  In Akers v.
Lord,218 the court reviewed an action to enforce a logging lien bought
by the unpaid workers of a logging company.219  The workers sued
both their employer and the landowner. 2 0 The landowner was found
liable for "eloignment" (removal of lumber subject to a lien) and had
to pay the loggers.221 The defendant landowner then attempted to
pursue a claim of equitable subrogation against the defendant
employer.22 The court rejected the claim, holding that:
Subrogation is a doctrine of purely equitable origin and nature, and
its operation is always controlled by equitable principles. The only
liability enforceable against appellants grows out of their own
wrongful act-the eloignment of the logs and lumber subject to
respondents' liens. They are not, therefore, in a position to claim
211. See id. at 581.
212. Id.; see also Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416 (1972) (dean
hands required); SHELDON ON SUBROGATION § 44 (2d ed. 1893).
213. 73 AM. JUR. 2d, Subrogation § 18 (citing German Bank of Memphis v. United States,
148 U.S. 573) (1893).
214. 168 P.2d 549 (Colo. 1946).
215. See id.
216. Id. at 551 (citing German Bank of Memphis, 148 U.S. 573 and Akers v. Lord, 67 Wash.
179, 121 Pac. 51 (1912)).
217. Note that the holding in Newcomer v. Masini, is not inconsistent with this rule. First,
the third-party defendant in that matter never raised the "clean hands" issue, so it was not
discussed. And second, the third-party plaintiff was found to have clean hands, viz., no
negligence. 45 Wash. App. 284, 724 P.2d 1122.
218. 67 Wash. 179, 121 P. 51 (1912).
219. See id. at 180, 121 P. at 51.
220. See id., 67 Wash. at 180, 121 P. at 51.
221. See id. at 180-81, 121 P. at 51.
222. See id. at 185, 121 P. at 53.
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any equitable relief as against anyone, being themselves wrong-
doers. 2
3
In conclusion, the clean hands doctrine is merely a restatement of
the same policy forbidding an actively negligent tortfeasor from pursing
another through an equitable action for indemnification or contribu-
tion. Thus, because an actively negligent tortfeasor does not have
clean hands, it cannot sue for subrogation.
The remaining question to be addressed is whether a passively
negligent tortfeasor (one whose negligence arises by operation of law,
as with vicarious liability), can sue an actively negligent tortfeasor for
subrogation. Such a claim is complicated by the fact that a similar
type of action, implied indemnity, was abolished by the 1981 Tort
Reform Act. The question becomes whether this Act likewise
abolished claims for equitable subrogation.
III. THE TORT REFORM ACT OF 1981: A LIMITED RIGHT OF
CONTRIBUTION REPLACED IMPLIED INDEMNITY, BUT
EQUITABLE SUBROGATION SURVIVED
A. Implied Indemnity and Equitable Subrogation
Are Similar Doctrines
Implied indemnity-the active-passive exception to the common-
law bar of indemnification-was abolished in 1981 in favor of a
statutorily created right of contribution.224 That year, the legislature
created a statutory right of contribution among jointly and severally
liable defendants.22  At the same time, the legislature abolished the
doctrine of indemnification.226 Stated otherwise, "[i]n 1981 the Tort
Reform Act abolished common law indemnity and substituted therefor
the right of contribution. ' 2 7
223. Id. at 185, 121 P. at 53.
224. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(3) (1996).
225. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040-.050 (1996).
226. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(3).
227. Johnson v. Continental West, 99 Wash. 2d 555, 558, 663 P.2d 482, 484 (1983). It
should be noted that there is some dispute as to the efficacy of the abolition of indemnity in at
least two contexts. See Harris, supra note 132, at 163-66 (concluding that not even the express
language of Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.040(3) was sufficient to eliminate indemnification actions in
vicarious liability, and "enhanced injury" cases). But see Guard v. Town Friday Harbor, 22
Wash. App. 758, 767-68, 592 P.2d 652, 658 (1979) (concluding that common-law right of
indemnification between active and passive tortfeasors includes action by vicariously liable
employer against its employee); Zamora v. Mobil Oil, 104 Wash. 2d 211, 219-20, 704 P.2d 591,
596 (1985) (concluding that Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.040(3) affected the total abolition of common
law indemnity).
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The Tort Reform Act of 1981 might appear to have also abolished
the doctrine of equitable subrogation, at least in actions brought by a
passive tortfeasor against an active tortfeasor, when it abolished
equitable indemnity.22 As equitable subrogation is closely related
to indemnification, one could argue that it too was abolished along
with implied indemnity.
Equitable subrogation is based on the principle of indemnifica-
tion.229 And as discussed above, both doctrines are corollaries of
unjust enrichment.23° As with indemnification, subrogation is not
permitted when both tortfeasors have "primary" liability, but only by
one who has "secondary" liability against another whose liability is"primary." The law is unequivocal: "the right of subrogation never
follows an actual primary liability .. ."231
Equitable subrogation between a principal and an agent may be
said to fall within the active-passive exception to the rule prohibiting
indemnification. In United States Lines, Inc. v. United States,2 32 after
holding that an active-passive indemnity suit could go forward, the
court refused to rule on the third-party plaintiffs subrogation
claim.233  "It is extremely difficult to tell legal subrogation and
implied indemnity apart. They are closely related and 'oftentimes the
possessor of one right is also the possessor of the other.' In their outer
bounds the difference between them is about that between cherubim
and seraphim in the angelic orders." 234
Thus, although not expressly mentioned by the Legislature in
1981 when indemnification was abolished, and because the doctrines
are interrelated, it is possible that subrogation claims were likewise
eliminated. However, under the rules of statutory construction, there
is a compelling basis to reject the notion that the 1981 Act also
eliminated equitable subrogation.
B. 1981 Tort Reform Act Did Not Abolish Equitable Subrogation
The pre-1986 Tort Reform Act decision in Newcomer v. Masini
did not address the issue of whether both indemnity and subrogation
228. The courts have long recognized a master's right to pursue subrogation from the
servant, whose acts rendered the master vicariously liable. See 73 AM. JUR. 2d, Subrogation § 39,
at 623 (1974); 83 C.J.S., Subrogation § 16, at 617 (1953).
229. See Newcomer, 45 Wash. App. 284, 724 P.2d 1122.
230. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
231. Livingston v. Shelton, 85 Wash. 2d 615, 619, 537 P.2d 774, 777 (1975).
232. 470 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1972).
233. See id. at 493-94.
234. Id. at 494 (citations omitted).
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were eliminated by the 1981 Act. The Newcomer court allowed the
subrogation claim but in a footnote acknowledged that common law
indemnity had been abolished.235 While this comment implies that
the 1981 Act did not abolish equitable subrogation between tortfeasors,
the court did not specifically address the question. Subsequent to
Newcomer, the court stated that the issue remains open: "Whether the
doctrine of equitable subrogation is eliminated under RCW 4.22.040
has not been examined. 236
Rules of statutory construction suggest that subrogation was not
abolished. "In the absence of an indication from the Legislature that
it intended to overrule the common law, new legislation will be
presumed to be in line with prior judicial decisions in a field of
law[.]" 237 Further, "a statute will not be construed in derogation of
the common law unless the Legislature has clearly expressed its
intention to vary it. 238
A related rule of statutory construction is that of "expressio unius,
est exclusio alterius." '39 That is, the express mention of one item in
a statute implies the intentional omission of all other related items.240
Although the 1981 Legislature expressly indicated its intention to
eliminate implied indemnity, it made no mention of equitable
subrogation-a related but conceptually distinct doctrine. Because the
statute is silent on the point, subrogation most likely survived the 1981
Act.
Whatever rule of statutory construction is used, the conclusion
seems plain that the Legislature's failure to expressly abolish equitable
subrogation in 1981 speaks to its continuing existence. As such,
equitable subrogation was not affected by the 1981 Tort Reform Act's
elimination of implied indemnity. However, even if such a right does
still exist, because a statutory right of contribution provides an
adequate remedy, it is not likely that the courts will allow an action for
equitable subrogation to be advanced in the active-passive context.
235. See 45 Wash. App. 284, 286 n.1, 724 P.2d 1122, 1124 n.1 (1986).
236. Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 117 Wash. 2d 1, 18 n.8, 810 P.2d 917, 926 n.8 (1991).
237. Stahl Specialty Co., 97 Wash. 2d at 887-88, 652 P.2d at 952.
238. Price v. Kitsap Transit, 125 Wash. 2d 456, 463, 886 P.2d 556, 560 (1994). See also
State v. Bushnell, 38 Wash. App. 809, 811, 690 P.2d 601, 602 (1984).
239. See Harmon v. Dept. of Soc. and Health Svc., 83 Wash. App. 596, 601, 922 P.2d 201,
204 (1996).
240. See id.
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C. The Statutory Right of Contribution Obviates the Need
for an Equitable Remedy
Before a claim for equitable subrogation can be advanced, it must
be determined whether a statutory right of contribution exists in the
active-passive context. If a right of contribution exists between active
and passive tortfeasors, the courts will probably decline to exercise
their equitable jurisdiction to create a remedy.
The contribution statutes24 1 and not equity will define the
liability of an actively negligent tortfeasor as to one who is passively
negligent. The court some time ago acknowledged the "well-settled"
doctrine of equitable subrogation, but refused to apply it for this very
reason: "[I]t is equally well settled that, where the liability of a party
is fixed by contract or by statute, courts will not resort to equity to
either enlarge or defeat them. ' 242  Stated otherwise, "[e]quitable
principles cannot be asserted to establish equitable relief in derogation
of statutory mandates. 243
D. Despite Conceptual Difficulties, the Right of
Contribution Does Apply
If a right of contribution does exist between an employer/principal
and an employee/agent, resorting to equitable subrogation will be
unnecessary. However, two noted scholars have expressed their doubts
on the application of contribution in this context. In Washington's
Unique Approach to Partial Tort Settlements: The Modified Pro Tanto
Credit and the Reasonableness Hearing Requirement,244 Thomas V.
Harris opines that contribution would not apply.245 The article
concludes that not only is contribution inapplicable, but that implied
indemnity survived the statutory abolition of indemnity, at least in
241. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040-.050.
242. Southwestern Surety Ins. Co. v. Pacific Coast Cas. Co., 92 Wash. 654, 658, 159 P. 788,
789 (1916).
243. Longview Fibre Co. v. Cowlitz Co., 114 Wash. 2d 691, 699, 790 P.2d 149 (1990)
(citing Department of Labor & Indus. v. Dillon, 28 Wash. App. 853, 855, 626 P.2d 1004 (1981)).
See also Stephanus v. Anderson, 26 Wash. App. 326, 334, 613 P.2d 533, review denied, 94 Wash.
2d 1014 (1980) (holding that while equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy, equity "also
follows the law and cannot provide a remedy where legislation expressly denies it"); Williams v.
Duke, 125 Wash. 250, 254, 215 P. 372 (1923) (holding that where the rights of the parties are
clearly defined and established by law, equity has no power to change or unsettle those rights,
citing doctrine of equitas sequitar legem).
244. See Harris, supra note 132.
245. See id.
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cases of vicarious liability.24 6 Regarding the absence of contribution,
Mr. Harris writes,
Although the Act's legislative history is confusing, the Act should
not be construed as abolishing the right to indemnity based on
vicarious liability. Principles of proportionate fault do not protect
a blameless defendant held liable solely by operation of law. The
fault of two entities cannot be quantitatively compared under such
circumstances. They are liable for the very same act. 47
Likewise, in one of his articles, Professor Gregory C. Sisk argues
similarly that contribution makes little sense between a vicariously
liable principal and an actively negligent agent.24
As between a principal and an agent, allocation of fault may well be
impossible. The principal is vicariously liable for the very same
culpable act as the primarily liable agent. As one commentator has
noted, "[b]ecause vicarious liability is based on the relationship
between the actual tortfeasor and some other party responsible for
the tortfeasor's conduct, assigning separate shares of liability to each
is illogical." Accordingly, comparative fault cannot serve as the
basis for contribution between a vicariously liable principal and a
primarily liable agent. Instead, in accordance with the common law
of agency, when a principal is held liable for the unauthorized
tortious actions of an agent, the principal would presumably remain
entitled to full indemnification from the agent.249
As Mr. Harris and Professor Sisk observe, the application of
contribution in this area is analytically problematic. While the
contribution statute provides that "[t]he basis for contribution among
liable persons is the comparative fault of each such person,"250 there
is little rational basis to divide fault between primarily and secondarily
liable parties, and any attempt to do so is "simply impossible. 25'
If a vicariously liable party has no fault, one could argue that there
is no right of contribution. However, this argument's underlying
assumption-that the jury must assign some percentage of fault to the
principal/employer-is open to debate. There is no rule that mandates
246. See id. at 163-66 (also concluding that implied indemnity survives in "enhanced injury"
claims).
247. Id. at 164-65 (footnotes omitted).
248. See Sisk, supra note 22, at 116-18.
249. Id. at 117-18 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Scott I. Anderson, Comment, Contribution
Among TortFeasors in Washington: The 1981 Tort Reform Act, 57 WASH. L. REV. 479, 486
(1982)).
250. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(1) (1996).
251. See Sisk, supra note 22, at 116-17.
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that the principal/employer must be found partially at fault. Indeed,
the jury would satisfy its statutory duty by apportioning all the fault
to the agent/employee, and no fault to the employer/principal.
Recently, the Washington Court of Appeals held, on a related
question, that an actively negligent agent has no cause of action for
contribution against a principal to recoup his payment of a judgment
to the tort victim.252 The court's analysis is of assistance in deter-
mining the answer to the converse question-whether the principal
may sue the agent for contribution.
The Gass court initially held, because the principal was not a
party to the underlying tort action, that under the factual joint and
several liability scheme of the 1986 Act, the principal could not be
jointly and severally liable with the agent.2"3  "Only when the
principal is a 'party' (to the original action) does the principal become
responsible for the fault of the agent.125 4
The Gass court also concluded that a "second and more funda-
mental rationale" existed for dismissing the agent's contribution
action.2 55 Comparative fault is the "sole basis" for contribution.25 6
"It follows that when a contribution defendant has no comparative
fault, there is no basis for contribution. "257
Although the agent in Gass was found negligent by the jury, the
only theory against the principal was vicarious liability under the
doctrine of respondeat superior.5 ' Such liability does not arise from
any act or omission of the principal, but rather "by operation of
law." '259  Thus, the principal had no "fault."26  "As between the
principal and the agent, the comparative fault of the agent is 100
percent."26  Conversely, the "comparative fault of the principal is 0
percent." '262 The court in Gass then reached the rather obvious
conclusion that a person who has "zero fault" should not be required
to reimburse one who was 100 percent at fault.263
252. See Gass v. MacPherson's Inc., 79 Wash. App. 65, 899 P.2d 1325 (1995).
253. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a). See also supra notes 58-71 and accompanying
text.
254. Gass, 79 Wash. App. at 70, 899 P.2d at 1328.
255. See id. at 71, 899 P.2d at 1328.
256. See id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(1)).
257. Id.
258. See id. at 71, 899 P.2d at 1328.
259. Id.
260. See id.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.015 (1996).
261. Gass, 79 Wash. App. at 71, 899 P.2d at 1328.
262. Id.
263. See id.
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The vicariously liable principal commits no act that falls within
the definition of "fault." But does this conceptually prevent an action
for contribution by the principal? The answer-which this author
suggests is no-lies largely in how the courts have interpreted the 1981
Tort Reform Act.
There is an apparent conflict between how the courts have treated
contribution actions brought by an agent/employee and those brought
by a principal/employer. Because a vicariously liable principal has no
comparative fault, there is no basis for its employee's contribution
claim. The converse is not true, however. That is, the courts have
allowed contribution actions brought by employers, despite their lack
of comparative fault. If comparative fault is the "sole basis" for
contribution, it could be argued that each party must have some fault.
Clearly that has not been the case. The court in Gass indicated that
"[t]he comparative fault of the agent may in such a case provide the
principal with a basis for seeking contribution from the agent. 264
This anomaly is likely explained first by the fact that the 1981
Legislature intended to substitute the right of contribution that an
employer/principal had previously enjoyed for the right of implied
indemnity, which was abolished.265 Second, joint and several liability
appears to be a more significant basis for contribution than is
comparative fault-so long as the party against whom contribution is
sought (namely, the agent/employee) is at fault. Lastly, equitable
factors support the right of one who, although not at fault, has been
compelled to pay the debt of another to seek reimbursement from the
person whose actions created the obligation.26 6 It is recognized that
in this context the statutory contribution claim, generally a fault-
sharing mechanism, becomes more akin to indemnity, a fault-shifting
tool.
E. The Spirit and Intent of Legislation Prevails Over A Literal
Reading to Prevent an Illogical Consequence
When the Legislature created a right of contribution in 1981, it
simultaneously abolished the right of implied indemnity. The courts
264. Id.
265. See Final Report, supra note 128, at 636 ("The implied indemnity doctrine thus is
another form of the 'all or nothing' rule which is being departed from in this bill which favors
comparative fault principles.").
266. The agent should be required to exhaust its financial potential to compensate the
plaintiff before the principal becomes secondarily liable. See Marshall v. Chapman's Estate, 31
Wash. 2d 137, 144, 195 P.2d 656, 660 (1948). See also Glover v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 98 Wash.
2d 708, 720, 658 P.2d 1230, 1237 (1983).
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had historically allowed a claim of implied indemnity if brought by a
passively (vicariously) liable party against the person whose active
negligence created the liability. By specifically substituting contribu-
tion for implied indemnity, the legislature intended that the statutory
right of contribution be available to a passively negligent party. While
the application of contribution in the vicarious liability context is
conceptually problematic, the spirit of the 1981 Act should overcome
these difficulties.
When construing the statutory contribution provisions, the courts
should attach primary significance to the purpose of the 1981
provisions. The legislative intent of the statute encourages settlement
of claims by permitting defendants to know that when they settle a
claim the case is over and there is no remaining liability to any-
one-whether to the plaintiff or another defendant.267  Legislative
intent is a fundamental precept in rules of statutory construction.
In construing statutes, the goal is to carry out the intent of the
Legislature. In doing so, it is the duty of the court in interpreting
a statute to make the statute purposeful and effective. Any statutory
interpretation which would render an unreasonable and illogical
consequence should be avoided. Thus, in attempting to effect the
intent of the Legislature, an act must be construed as a whole,
harmonizing all provisions to ensure proper construction.2 68
"[I]f alternative interpretations are possible, the one that best advances
the overall legislative purpose should be adopted.1269  "[T]he spirit
... of the law should prevail over the letter of the law."270
This is precisely the analysis the court undertook in endorsing the
right of a vicariously liable employer to seek contribution against its
employee. In Kirk v. Moe, the employer settled a tort action brought
against him, his employee, and others.27' The employer claimed
liability was predicated solely upon the doctrine of vicarious liabili-
267. See WSPIE v. Fisons Corp. 122 Wash. 2d 299, 324, 858 P.2d 1054, 1067 (1993). See
also Final Report, supra note 128, at 636 ("It was a concern of the Committee that if a released
party could not be guaranteed that he would not be subject to additional liability at some point
in the future depending on some comparative fault apportionment, it would discourage parties
from entering into such releases."). The legislature also intended to "enact further reforms in the
tort law to create a fairer and more equitable distribution of liability among parties at fault." 1981
Wash. Laws ch. 27, § 1.
268. Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Entertainment Co., 106 Wash. 2d 1, 6, 721 P.2d
1, 4 (1986) (citations omitted).
269. Anderson v. Morris, 87 Wash. 2d 706, 716, 558 P.2d 155, 161 (1976).
270. In re R., 97 Wash. 2d 182, 187, 641 P.2d 704, 707 (1982).
271. 114 Wash. 2d 550, 789 P.2d 84 (1990).
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ty.272 The employer negotiated a release not only of himself, but also
of his employee who had refused to participate in the settlement. 3
The employer took these steps to preserve his right of contribution and
to comply with the 1981 Act, which requires a settling party to
extinguish the liability of the nonsettling party against whom contribu-
tion will later be sought.274
The employer, relying upon the 1981 Act, then sued his employee
for contribution. The employee argued that he was discharged
from liability not only for the underlying tort action but also for
contribution 6.2  This statute states, inter alia, that a release "entered
into by a claimant and a person liable discharges that person from all
liability for contribution. "277
The Kirk court rejected the employee's argument, concluding that
because he did not participate in the settlement, he was not discharged
from liability for contribution.278 The employee's position would"render meaningless" the right of a settling defendant under the 1981
Act to pursue contribution. 279 The court will not interpret a statute
. .."to produce an absurd result[] or render meaningless its enact-
ment. ' 20  The acceptance of the employee's argument would defeat
the statute's purpose of encouraging settlements, while insuring full
compensation for tort victims. 281 The court concluded "that RCW
4.22.040 grants to Kirk, the vicariously liable principle, a right of
contribution against Moe, his primarily liable agent, by virtue of Kirk's
settlement with the injured party when that settlement released the
272. See id. at 558, 789 P.2d at 88.
273. See id. at 552, 789 P.2d at 85-86.
274. See id. at 550, 789 P.2d at 84.
275. See Kirk, 114 Wash. 2d at 553, 789 P.2d at 86. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(2)
provides:
A release, covenant not to sue, covenant not to enforce judgment, or similar agreement
entered into by a claimant and a person liable discharges that person from all liability
for contribution, but it does not discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim
unless it so provides. However, the claim of the releasing person against other persons
is reduced by the amount paid pursuant to the agreement unless the amount paid was
unreasonable at the time of the agreement in which case the claim shall be reduced by
an amount determined by the court to be reasonable.
276. See Kirk, 114 Wash. 2d at 554, 789 P.2d at 86.
277. Id.
278. See id. at 554, 789 P.2d at 86-87.
279. See id.
280. Id.
281. See id. at 555, 789 P.2d at 87. It should be noted that the court in Kirk relied upon
Mr. Harris' article in reaching its conclusion that the employer's contribution claim was proper.
Id. (quoting Harris, supra note 132, at 112). This portion of the article had set forth the
underlying purpose of the contribution statute. See Harris, supra note 132, at 112.
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agent, subject to the reasonableness of the settlement." '282 Thus, the
Washington courts have demonstrated that they are willing to
overcome overly literal constructions and interpret the 1981 Act
consistent with its legislative intent." 3
The underlying rationale of the Harris/Sisk thesis is that the court
should take a common sense approach to the issue.284 However, the
1981 Legislature may well have meant what it said in proclaiming that
the "common law right of indemnity between active and passive tort
feasors is abolished."28  This author's rationale, however, applies
with like force to an argument that a right of contribution does indeed
apply---conceptually flawed as it is.
In sum, while the Harris/Sisk concern (that a vicariously liable
principal or employer does not possess a statutory right of contribution
against a primarily liable agent or employee) is supported by a
technical reading of the 1981 Act, it should give way to an interpreta-
tion of the Act that is consistent with its spirit. The Legislature
intended the right of contribution to replace the right of implied
indemnity, which a passively negligent party previously possessed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the harshness of the rule, the common law does not
permit one actively negligent tortfeasor to pursue another actively
negligent tortfeasor for reimbursement of a payment made to a tort
victim. This is true whether the claim is one for contribution,
indemnification, or equitable subrogation. To ameliorate the inequity
of the common law, the Washington Legislature in 1981 enacted a
statutory right of contribution. In so doing, the Legislature concomi-
tantly abolished implied indemnity. Thus, the statutory right of
contribution is the sole cause of action by which one actively negligent
tortfeasor may sue another for reimbursement.
282. Kirk, 114 Wash. 2d at 556, 789 P.2d at 87. See also Zamora v. Mobil Oil, 104 Wash.
2d 211, 704 P.2d 591 (1985); and Glover, 98 Wash. 2d 708, 658 P.2d 1230.
283. See supra notes 253-65 and 274-83 and accompanying text.
284. The discussion thus far has focused on a defendant-principal's rights post-judgment and
payment therefor. It must be remembered that should a vicariously liable entity decide to settle
pre-suit, the procedural requirements of the Act must be followed. That is, (1) the principal must
extinguish the liability of the agent in the settlement agreement, and (2) the amount paid must
be reasonable. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(2). Additionally, a principal who desires to
settle a pending action must provide written notice to all other parties and to the court. See
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(1) (1996). A reasonableness hearing must then be held. Id. For
a discussion of the nine nonexclusive criteria that a court should apply to determine whether a
settlement was "reasonable," see Glover, 98 Wash. 2d at 717-18, 658 P.2d at 1236.
285. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(3).
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The passage five years later of the Tort Reform Act of 1986
largely eliminated any need for tortfeasors to pursue one another for
contribution. The elimination of joint and several liability (in most
cases) removes not only the need for a contribution action, but also the
basis to bring one. A right of contribution arises only where a jointly
and severally liable torifeasor has been forced to pay more than its
share. However, the basic premise of the 1986 Act with two excep-
tions is that defendants will never pay more than their proportionate
share. Thus, much like Francis Macomber,8 6 contribution enjoyed
only a short but inspired existence.
The two exceptions to the general rule of proportionate liability
are factual joint and several liability and procedural joint and several
liability. The procedural exception requires the procedural entry of a
judgment against defendants. The sole remaining utility of the right
of contribution under this exception would involve a post-judgment
action to seek reimbursement of a payment made on behalf of one's
jointly and severally liable co-defendant. As the reason that many co-
defendants do not pay their judgment share is that they are insolvent,
the pursuit of a contribution claim in this context is seldom practical.
Contribution may also exist in the factual joint and several
liability exception to the general rule, which involves the factual
existence of an agency, employment, or conspiracy relationship.
However, because a vicariously liable principal/employer is not"actively" negligent, the common law bar of seeking reimbursement
does not apply. The issue presented is which one of the three causes
of action should be pursued: contribution, indemnification, or
subrogation. As the 1981 legislature eliminated indemnification and
substituted in its place contribution, an action for indemnity cannot lie.
A claim for equitable subrogation seems well-suited to this context, as
the common law specifically recognizes such an action for "paying the
debt of another." However, equity will not create a cause of action if
a statutory remedy exists.
The question of whether a principal/employer may pursue a
statutory right of contribution against an agent/employee is subject to
some debate. The argument against its application is that a right of
contribution is based upon the comparative fault of the parties:
because the comparative fault of the secondarily liable principal/
employer is zero, the literal terms of the statute do not apply.
286. The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber: The Fifth Column and the First 49
Stories. (Modem Library, 1938).
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However, the Legislature seems to have intended such actions to
apply. Indeed, when the 1981 Legislature took away indemnity claims
from employers and principals, it substituted in its place a right of
contribution. The spirit of the law should prevail over an overly-literal
interpretation, even in light of the conceptual difficulties with the
statutory language. In addition, the courts have construed the statute
accordingly, recognizing on several occasions the right of a principal/
employer to pursue contribution from its agent/employee. Thus,
because a right of action for statutory contribution does exist in this
context, courts will generally not exercise their equitable jurisdiction to
authorize a claim for subrogation. The statutory remedy should be
sufficient.
